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 The main topic of investigation in the article is role of the state in promoting 
development. This article argues that, during the 19th century and at the beginning 
of 20th century, liberalism had a positive impact on economic growth because lib-
eral economy reduced predatory role of the state in the economy. However, the 
Great Depression showed limits of classical liberal capitalism. Therefore, the con-
cept of developmental state replaced liberal economy. Empirical investigation 
shows that, during the last fifty years, almost all the countries that had fast growth 
of GDP per capita had very strong role of the state in promoting development. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1980s, neoliberal concept prevailed once again. 
As a consequence, reduction of state interventionism has had a negative impact on 
development around the world. Hence, it is important to reexamine role of the 
state. After investigating role of the state from historical, empirical and theoretical 
prospective, this article concludes that a prudent and comprehensive state inter-
ventionism produces better developmental results than (neo)classical model of 
capitalism. 
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 This article investigates the theoretical debate and the historical experience concern-
ing the role of the state in promoting development. The main hypothesis is that, in mod-
ern time, almost all the countries that were the most successful in promoting develop-
ment had very strong role of the state in the economy.  
 Until Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations (1776) it was assumed that the 
state had the most important role in economic prosperity of a country. Smith’s book was 
really a revolution in social science, because this book revealed the power of the “in-
visible hand” of the market. Smith’s book was not only a panegyric to the market but 
also a strong criticism of the role of the state in the economy. “The uniform, constant, 
and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which 
public and national as well as private opulence is originally derived has been powerful 
enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of 
the extravagance of governments and of the greatest errors of administration” (Smith, 
1930: 325). 
 For Smith, government is the problem and the market is the solution to the problem. 
Smith had many reasons for this claim. From the 15th century until the end of the 18th 
century GDP per capita growth was, on average, only .04 percent annually (Maddison, 
1995: 20). Though the state conducted certain activities for the well-being of the entire 
population (protection from foreign invasion, for example) and although the mercantilist 
state might have had certain positive influence on the economy, there is no doubt that, 
during this period, the state had mainly a predatory function. Precise measurements of 
income inequality are not available until very recent time. However, it is enough to 
compare the luxury of the palaces in which nobility used to live with the living condi-
tions of the poor people – a great majority of the population – to conclude that up until 
the 19th century the state was used almost exclusively for exploitation. Therefore, a lib-
eral idea that demanded a limited role of the state in the economy had a positive influ-
ence on economic growth.  
 It is probably not a coincidence that Smith’s book was published in the same year 
(1776) when the American Congress declared independence, and it is sure that the 
Founding Fathers were influenced by Smith’s work. Jefferson’s motto – that govern-
ment is best which governs least – is a paraphrase of Smith’s thoughts. The first modern 
democracy, the USA, combined democracy with liberalism. This combination has 
proven to be very successful in promoting development. During the 1830-70 period, the 
United States (the only democratic country in the world until 1868) had an average rate 
of GDP per capita growth of 1.3 percent per year.1 In this period, the average rate of 
growth for entire world was less than .6 percent per year (Maddison, 1995: 60). During 
the 1830-1929 period other democracies, which also combined democracy with laissez-
faire capitalism, were much more successful than dictatorships in promoting economic 
growth. During this period of time, they had GDP per capita growth of approximately 2 
percent per year. In contrast, dictatorships posted less than 1.3 percent annual GDP per 
capita growth from 1870-1913 and less than .9 percent annual growth during the 1913-
50 period. 
 Liberalism, meaning limiting the role of the state in the economy, decreased preda-
tory capabilities of the state. In addition, the introduction of democracy also decreased 
the predatory function of the state because politicians had to pay attention to voter 
opinions. Therefore, the period from 1776-1929 was a triumph of the liberal idea that 
 
1 All the data about GDP per capita growth prior to 1951 are from Maddison (1995). Classification of re-
gimes is taken from Przeworski et al. (2000; 104-5). 
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direct state intervention in the economy has a harmful effect. Economic success of lib-
eral countries confirmed the main postulates of liberalism. At the beginning of the 20th 
century it seemed obvious that the market is good and state interventionism in the econ-
omy is bad. Furthermore, the period from 1815 till 1914 was one of the most peaceful 
periods in human history. It was assumed that liberalism, bolstering international trade, 
promoted peace and this, in turn, upheld economic growth.2 
 World War I and the October Revolution were the first signs that liberal order is far 
from perfect. There are many factors that caused WWI. However, there is no doubt that 
competition among capitalist countries for colonies was one of the factors, if not the 
most important factor, that caused this war. World War I was proof that liberalism does 
not guarantee peace and economic growth. Furthermore, huge social differences in all 
the countries in the world, which were not decreased with the introduction of liberal 
capitalism, helped to bring on communism in Russia. Moreover, the Great Depression 
(1929-32) challenged the idea that the market alone, without state intervention, could 
solve economic problems. During the same period of time when the West was in a deep 
economic depression, the Soviet economy – which was completely under the control of 
the state – started a rapid industrialization, and from 1928-41 the Soviet economy had 
faster economic growth than capitalist economies.  
 Liberal democracies did not use all of the potential of the state in promoting eco-
nomic growth. There are two main reasons for this. First, state interventionism goes 
against liberal ideology. Second, state interventionism always demands a certain level 
of redistribution of wealth and this is exactly what the governing elite in liberal democ-
racies wanted to prevent.3 Therefore, they did not optimize resources. In addition, lib-
eral democracies bred huge social differences. Laissez-faire democracies decreased the 
predatory functions of the state but they did not use the state as a tool for reducing ine-
quality. In contrast, the communist regimes used the state for promoting economic 
growth and for decreasing social differences. When the communists took power they 
nationalized national resources. These resources – which were used very inefficiently 
during the period of czarism – were invested in industrialization, education, infrastruc-
ture, health care etc. Furthermore, nationalization decreased social differences that were 
enormous during czarism. Rapid economic growth was a consequence of these meas-
ures. 
 The changes occurred not only in the Soviet Union but also in the West. Fascist 
corporatism in Italy, state capitalism in Germany, New Deal in the USA all had one 
thing in common – a state regulated economic process. These political and economic 
processes were echoed in economic theory. In The General Theory of Employment, In-
terest and Money (1936), Keynes argued that the government should regulate business 
cycles. On the basis of Keynes’ economic theory, the USA not only solved the eco-
nomic crisis but also, in 1945, started to be the strongest economic and military power 
in the world. In that year, the USA produced approximately 50 percent of GDP of the 
entire world and was the only nuclear power in the world. According to the World Bank 
 
2 About the relationship between liberalism and peace see Kant, 1796; Owen, 1994; Layne, 1994; Cope-
land, 1996 etc.  
3 It was already stated above that state intervention, in a predatory state, might further increase social ine-
qualities. For analysis of state intervention that increased social inequality in Africa see, for example, Bates, 
1981. The paragraph above wants to stress that liberal democracies tend to prevent the usage of state appa-
ratus for the promotion of social equality.  
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“the Great Depression was seen as a failure of capitalism and markets, while state inter-
vention (...) seemed to record one success after another” (1997: 23). 
 However, critics of the welfare state, which was the consequence of Keynesianism, 
came from the leftist and from the rightist perspective. For communists, the welfare 
state is only another type of exploitation of the proletariat. Since during the Cold War 
the USSR was on equal footing with the USA in military might, having at the same time 
faster growth of GDP than the USA, the Soviet model was attractive for new inde-
pendent states. Most developing countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa came out 
of the colonial period with a strong belief in state-dominated economic development. 
The state would mobilize resources and people and direct them toward rapid growth and 
the eradication of social injustice. State control of the economy, following the example 
of the Soviet Union, was central to this strategy (The World Bank, 1997: 23). 
 In contrast, for rightist economists who follow the principles of classical liberalism, 
the welfare state means too much state. According to Hayek, “that hodgepodge of ill-as-
sembled and often inconsistent ideals which under the name of the Welfare State has 
largely replaced socialism as the goal of reformers needs very careful sorting-out if its 
results are not to be very similar to those of full-fledged socialism” (1994: xxxiv, 6). 
And, for Hayek, socialism is the road to serfdom. “Few are ready to recognize that the 
rise of fascism and nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preced-
ing period but a necessary outcome of these tendencies.” 
 Milton Friedman goes a step further. According to him, almost all the activities of 
the welfare state can be much more efficiently performed through private initiatives. For 
Friedman, social security, public assistance, housing subsides, Medicare, Medicaid, 
even public schools are a waste of money. Friedman’s opinion about public health care 
shows the essence of his theory: “Two major arguments are offered for introducing so-
cialized medicine in the United States: first, that medical costs are beyond the means of 
most Americans; second, that socialization will somehow reduce cost. The second can 
be dismissed out of hand – at least until someone can find some example of an activity 
that is conducted more economically by government than by private enterprise” (italics 
– M. A.) (Friedman/Friedman, 1990: 115).  
 For Friedman, whether government can conduct an activity more economically than 
private enterprise it is not even worthy of discussion. Friedman even argues that free 
market decreases inequality among people. For Friedman, market is a panacea and any 
state intervention is detrimental to the economy.  
 Theoretically speaking, there were three possible outcomes of the Cold War. The 
first one could have been a total triumph of communist ideology around the world. A 
song that was produced by communist propaganda had the following lines (in Croatian): 
Amerika i Engleska bit će zemlja proleterska.4 Orthodox communists expected not only 
the survival of communism in existing communist countries but also an outbreak of 
communist revolutions around the world. The second possible solution could have been 
a convergence between capitalism and communism, a sort of mixed system that 
incorporates the advantages of both systems. However, according to Fukuyama the third 
possible outcome prevailed – the full triumph of liberalism. “The triumph of West, of 
the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alter-
natives to Western liberalism” (1989: 5). Even though Fukuyama overlooked some 
 
4 America and England will be countries ruled by proletariat. Above, it was written in Croatian because of 
rhyme.  
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historical facts,5 there is no doubt that, at the end of 1980s, the idea that liberal capital-
ism is the best solution prevailed once again. The collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union provided a crucial argument that state intervention in the 
economy is harmful. According to the World Bank, “the collapse of the Soviet Union – 
by then no longer an attractive model – sounded the death knell for a developmental era. 
Suddenly, government failure, including the failure of publicly owned firms, seemed 
everywhere glaringly evident. Governments began to adopt policies designed to reduce 
the scope of the state intervention in the economy. States curbed their involvement in 
production, prices and trade” (1997: 23). 
 As a result, many countries reduced government expenditure on education, health 
care and infrastructure. State owned enterprises started to be privatized. In developing 
countries, central government expenditure decreased during the 1990s (The World 
Bank, 1997: 2). The triumph of liberal capitalism was almost omnipresent.6 Even Russia 
accepted the idea of a minimal state role in the economy. Instead of having too strong a 
state, Russia started to have a weak state incapable of providing basic services. Holmes 
describes the consequences of this situation: “Ironically, Russians today have more rea-
sons to worry about the debility of state than about its power (...) Total tax revenues as a 
percentage of gross domestic product hover somewhere below 10 percent (...) compared 
with roughly 30 percent in the United States and an average of 45 percent in Eastern 
Europe” (1997: 66-7). 
 The negative consequences of imposing laissez-faire capitalism started to be espe-
cially evident in Eastern Europe. To illustrate, 168 million people in Eastern Europe are 
now in poverty in contrast to 13.6 million before the fall of communism (The World 
Bank, 1999: 7). In Russia, from 1989 to 1994, male life expectancy dropped from 64.4 
to 57.3 years (Heleniak 1995, 1-5). Male life expectancy fell in half the transition coun-
tries in the early postcommunist era (Murell, 1996: 40). In addition, from 1991 till 1993, 
the death rate increased by 26 percent and the infant mortality rate increased by 4 per-
cent (UNICEF, 1993). The decline in life expectancy was predominantly a result of 
malnutrition. In Moldova, between 1990 and 1996, there was a decline in the per capita 
consumption of meat by 57 percent, of milk and dairy products 48 percent and of sugar 
60 percent (Beams, 1999). The negative consequences of imposing laissez-faire capital-
ism started to be evident not only in Eastern Europe but also in Africa and in Latin 
America. Some investigations showed that the revival of liberal capitalism had negative 
consequences even in the USA. According to Thurow (1996: 22), social inequalities in 
the USA are now similar to the period before the Great Depression. As a consequence, 
average median earnings for males fell 11 percent in the 1990’s compared to the 1970’s. 
Greater social inequalities produced higher rates of crime. The USA, a country with the 
greatest social differences among industrialized countries, also has one of the highest 
rates of crime. An American citizen has a 14 times higher probability of being murdered 
than a Japanese citizen and an American woman faces a 29 times higher risk of being 
raped than a woman in Japan. An American also has 146 times higher probability to be 
a victim of robbery than a Japanese (Lipset, 1996: 227). Yet, among industrialized 
countries, Japan has one of the strongest and the USA one of the weakest roles of the 
state in the economy.  
 
5 For example he overlooked the fact that, in 19th century, it was Marxists who fought for universal suf-
frage and liberals were against. Therefore, triumph of democracy in Europe is, in a way, a triumph of social-
democratic variance of Marxism.  
6 Even though China exposed itself to world market and foreign investments, China did not follow domi-
nant trends.  
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 To give an additional example, the USA has, among industrialized countries, the 
lowest percentage of public share of total health spending. Contrary to Friedman’s pre-
diction, this fact did not decrease expenditures for health care. In 1990, the USA spent 
12.5 percent of national GDP on health care. In contrast, in Japan, where government 
covers health expenditures, only 7 percent of GDP was spent on health care (The World 
Bank, 1993: 110).7 However, life expectancy was, in 1990, 79 years in Japan and 75 
years in the USA. Furthermore, black people in the USA have lower chance of reaching 
mature ages than do people in China, Sri Lanka and in some parts of India (Sen, 2000: 
6). Contrary to Friedman’s assertion, it is not difficult at all to find an activity that is 
conducted more economically by government than by private enterprise – health care.  
 Failures of liberal capitalism provoked, once again, a discussion about the role of the 
state in development. Since East Asian countries experienced, in addition to communist 
countries, the most rapid rates of economic growth, many authors investigated the role 
of the state in this region. It is interesting that proponents of liberal capitalism claim that 
the success of the “Asian tigers” is a confirmation that the market, not the state, is the 
main engine of economic growth. For example, Friedman and Friedman assert: “Malay-
sia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan – all relying exclusively on pri-
vate markets – are thriving (...) By contrast, India, Indonesia, and Communist China, all 
relying on central planning, have experienced economic decline” (1990: 57). It is barely 
worthy to discuss whether China experienced economic decline or miraculous economic 
growth. Introducing reforms but also relying on central planning,8 China achieved the 
fastest growth of GDP per capita in the world in the last two decades.9 However, it is 
worthy to discuss whether the East Asian success is a result of laissez-fair capitalism or 
of state interventionism. Here, what is most striking is not the similarity between princi-
ples of laissez-faire and the policy of the “Asian tigers” but a similarity between the 
policy of communist countries and the “Asian tigers”. To illustrate, land reform was one 
of the first measures of communist government in Yugoslavia. Similarly, in Japan, after 
World War II, “the land reforms (...) brought about the complete elimination of Japan’s 
landed elites” (Alam 1989, 117).  
 Among all the subtypes of political regimes, communist dictatorships had the high-
est level of social equality.10 Likewise, according to Pempel: “A second facet of Japan’s 
unusual policies relates to the nation’s broad income equality. For most of the postwar 
years, Japan was extremely egalitarian (...) The growth of Japanese capitalism did not 
entail yachts for executives, massive corporate dividends to stockholders, and layoffs 
 
7 If the USA reduced spending on the health care by 5.5 percent, the USA would save approximately $ 
550 billion annually. Each American would have to pay approximately $1,750 less annually for the health in-
surance. 
8 According to Business Monitor (2000: 19-91), non-private sector accounts for more than 2/3 of China’s 
industrial output. 
9 For the 1951-90 period, data about GDP per capita growth are form Przeworski et al. (2000) data set 
which is available at http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~cheibub/data/Default.htm. For the period from 1991-2001 
data are from CD-ROM World Development Indicators 2001, published by the World Bank, and from World 
Development Report 2003 and 2004. 
10 In average during the 1961-90 period, GINI index of inequality was 25 in communist dictatorships, 45 
in presidential democracies, 37 in semipresidential democracies, 36 in parliamentary democracies, 44 in mili-
tary dictatorships and 43 in civilian non-communist dictatorships. (Data about GINI index and classification 
of regimes are from Przeworski et al. (2000) data set. Classification of communist dictatorships is from Gastil 
(1981). 
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and downsizing for the workforce (...) In numerous other areas, such as education, in-
fant mortality crime, health care, caloric intake, and so forth, Japan has been strikingly 
egalitarian since 1950s (...) It is little wonder that 90 percent of Japan’s citizens typi-
cally identify themselves as middle class” (1998: 8-9). 
 Amsden et al. confirm Pempel’s findings. Comparing the experience of Eastern 
Europe and East Asia, they claim that “two key ingredients in East Asia’s success have 
been strongly represented in Eastern Europe in the early stages of transition: high levels 
of education and income equality” (1994: 15). 
 Communist countries were criticized for nationalizing their means of production. 
Liberal economic theory argues that state-owned properties are inefficient. Yet, Taiwan 
nationalized, after WWII, Japanese-owned factories. As a result, public enterprises sup-
plied, in 1952, 56.2 percent of gross manufacturing output (Alam, 1989: 73). In Taiwan, 
according to Evans (1995: 56), “the state enterprise sector not only makes a direct en-
trepreneurial contribution but is also a training ground for economic leadership in the 
central state bureaucracy”. According to Amsden (2001: 287), public enterprises were, 
in most cases, the “first movers” of the remarkable growth of East Asian countries.  
 A liberal dogma is that state intervention in the market leads to economic ineffi-
ciency.11 In contrast, Peter Evans’ book Embedded Autonomy (1995: 48) shows that 
activist, positive role of government could be a decisive factor in rapid industrial 
growth. The author showed that the economic success of Japan, Taiwan and Korea have 
been the result of a very active role of state in promoting economic and social develop-
ment. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was “the great-
est concentration of brainpower”. As a result, “Japan’s developmental state was a cen-
tral element in explaining the country’s post-World War Two economic miracle” (Ev-
ans, 1995: 47-8). Similarly, in South Korea, the state bureaucracy recruited the most tal-
ented students from the best universities. This bureaucracy conducted various activities: 
financing of public education12 and public health, investing in infrastructure, construct-
ing comparative advantages to compete in the world market, financing irrigation sys-
tems and fertilizers, protecting infant industries, financing science and technological de-
velopment, etc. Governments even invested in public enterprises. In Taiwan, the per-
centage of gross domestic investment originating in public corporations and government 
enterprises was between 23 and 40 percent during the 1951-73 period (Alam, 1989: 
61).13 In addition, it is possible even to find similarities between political systems in 
East Asia and in communist countries. According to Alam, “the concentration of power 
and the stability of leadership that we observe in these two countries [Taiwan and S. 
Korea – M. A.] are indeed rare outside of the communist countries” (1989: 21).  
 It is interesting that the above mentioned authors barely referenced the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. After 1990, for the authors who analyzed the success of the state in 
promoting development, this region was unimportant. There was almost a consensus 
among western economists and political scientists that Eastern Europe and Soviet Union 
can only be considered as examples of state failures. So, are communist countries a 
 
11 See, for example, Friedman/Friedman, 1990; Hayek, 1994; World Development Report, 1991; Amsden 
et al, 1994: 213-4.  
12 For example, at the end of 1980s, there were twice as many engineering students in South Korea as in 
the United Kingdom (Evans, 1995: 147).  
13 Actually, these figures were underestimated because they do not include investments in enterprises in 
which the share of state ownership was less than 51 percent.  
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proof that state interventionism has a harmful influence on economy? If this claim is 
true than we can expect communist dictatorships (which had the strongest role of state 
in the economy) to be the least successful in promoting economic growth. Since 1951 it 
is possible to measure rather accurately GDP per capita growth. Therefore, it is possible 
to check empirically success of different types of regimes. Data in Table 1 show, to say 
the least, that state interventionism did not have a harmful influence on economic 
growth in communist dictatorships. And this trend still continues. Two out of three fast-
est growing economies in the world, during the 1990-2002 period, are communist dic-
tatorships – China and Vietnam (see World Development Report, 2003: 238-9; World 
Development Report, 2004: 252-3). 
 
Table 1. GDP per capita growth14 in different subtypes of political regimes (1951-99) 
Regimes15 Average (%) 
Non-communist dictatorships 1.58 




Dictatorships (total) 1.77 
Democracies (total) 1.99 
 
 Analyses in this article show that communist countries were similar to East Asian 
countries not only concerning economic policy but also developmental achievements. 
This article also shows that an active role by the state has beneficial effects on economic 
and social development not only among “Asian tigers” and in Western Europe but also 
in communist countries. However, one fact can not be disputed – communism disap-
peared entirely from the place of its origin. It would be out of the scope of this article to 
present all – or even the most important – factors that caused collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe. Still, there is no doubt that massive production in these countries was 
not in accordance with demands, especially concerning quality of products. Therefore, 
the history of communist regimes can be proof for both that an active role by the state 
spurs economic growth and that a too weak market system may produce a collapse of 
the regime. The main advantage of East Asian countries, in comparison to East Euro-
pean countries and the former Soviet Union, is that the market complemented the ac-
tivities of the state. According to Amsden et al, “the state should not be opposed to the 
market, but should be treated as complementary to it” (1994: 180). Therefore, the ex-
 
14 As it was mentioned above, data about GDP per capita growth are from Przeworski et al. (2000) data 
set. The authors used data about economic growth from Summers and Heston’s Pen World Tables. According 
to Przeworski et al., 2000, Scully, 1992 and many other authors, these tables are the most reliable sources 
about economic growth available in the literature. Data about GDP per capita growth for the 1991-9 period are 
from The World Bank, 2001.  
15 Classification of regimes for the 1951-90 period is based on Przeworski et al. (2000) data set. For the 
1991-9 period this article uses an unpublished classification of regimes made by Antonio Cheibub. This clas-
sification is a continuation of classification that was conducted for the book Democracy and Development. I 
am grateful to Antonio Cheibub for allowing me to use his data set.  
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perience of communist countries and the “Asian tigers” show that the state needs the 
market and vice versa. 
 Furthermore, it is not enough to have an active role of state in the economy. If the 
state apparatus is corrupted and incompetent, state intervention may produce more harm 
than good. For example, Bates (1981) found that public institutions in Africa were used 
for private advantages. Only those who were supportive of government received public 
funds. Agricultural policies in Africa were harmful to most farmers. Larger farmers 
were taxed less due to their ties with the governing elite. Any edition of the World De-
velopment Report, by the World Bank, provides copious examples of government fail-
ures. Therefore, there is no wonder that Srinivasan, concluded that developmental state 
is an illusion. “Dominant view of the early development literature that a benevolent 
state, acting solely in the societal interest, and equipped with needed information, 
knowledge and policy instruments, can intervene in an optimal way to correct any mar-
ket failure and launch a society along the road to self-sustained and rapid development 
turned out to be much too optimistic, if not completely out of touch with realities. In-
stead, the state is seen to be pushed and pulled by lobbies and interest groups that are 
mostly interested in redistribution rather than growth and development” (1985: 45). 
 However, experience shows that building an efficient and uncorrupted bureaucracy 
is a difficult but possible endeavor. Max Weber (1978) stipulated, at the beginning of 
20th century, the main principles of modern bureaucracy. It is interesting to note that 
Asia is the place of origin of these principles. According to Ezra Vogel, “the develop-
ment of a meritocratically selected bureaucracy [is] one of the greatest contribution of 
East Asia to world civilization” (1991: 93). The experience of these countries shows 
that bureaucracy could be not only interested in promotion of growth and development 
but even the main actor of this promotion. To be capable of formulating and imple-
menting development plans, bureaucracy must be, according to Waldner, “endowed 
with certain organizational resources, including meritocratic norms of recruitment and 
promotion to ensure that agency is staffed with the requisite talent (...) and insulation 
from pressure groups to ensure depoliticized decision making” (1999: 42). 
 One additional issue might also challenge state interventionism – globalism.16 
According to Thurow, “in a global economy if a country is a high-tax, high-spending 
society, say Sweden, business will simply move to low-tax, low-spending society (...) to 
avoid taxes and Sweden will be left without the tax revenue necessary to finance the 
level of service that its voters might want” (1996: 130). There is no doubt that state in-
terventionism is expensive. However, the absence of state interventionism is frequently 
even more expensive. To illustrate, the free market produces enormous social inequali-
ties and these inequalities breed high rates of crime. Fighting against crime may be even 
more expensive than financing social programs, like education, that decrease social and 
economic inequalities. According to Thurow (1996: 84), “California’s prison budgets 
were double those of its universities, with state expenditures per person in prison four 
times as high as expenditures per person in its universities”. In addition, Rodrik (1997: 
25) found positive correlation between a nation’s openness to trade and the amount of 
its spending on social programs. A welfare state is more capable to annul negative con-
sequences of openness to the international economy. Resistance to globalization is 
stronger when people cannot count on governmental support if they lose jobs as a result 
of foreign competition. In addition, state interventionism may increase competitiveness 
of an economy at the world market. The East Asia is the prime example. Therefore, 
 
16 For globalization debate see Mander/Goldsmith, 1996; Giddens, 2000; Gilpin, 2000. 
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there is no reason to believe that laissez-fair economy is more complementary to glob-
alization than welfare state.  
  Fukuyama (1989) was correct claiming that the end of the 1980’s was a complete 
triumph of liberal ideas. However, it is possible that the 21st century will be a triumph of 
the theory of convergence. During the period of Roosevelt’s presidency, the United 
States started to be the most powerful economic and military power in the world. In the 
last quarter of the 20th century, China was economically the most successful. The New 
Deal and economic reforms in China have – in spite of their significant differences – 
one thing in common. In both cases liberalism was combined with state interventionism. 
It was not by chance that Roosevelt was criticized for bringing socialism in the USA. 
According to Thurow “Roosevelt designed the social welfare state that saved capitalism 
after it collapsed in America (...) Socialism was invented shortly after capitalism as a 
remedy to the visible nineteenth-century defects of capitalism – widening inequalities, 
rising unemployment, a growing workforce of castoffs” (1995: 4). 
 Economic reforms in China opened it to foreign investment, strengthened the role of 
the market and enabled private initiatives. In a word, China introduced some elements 
of capitalism. Of course, this article does not argue that the balance between socialist 
and capitalist elements was equal during the policy of New Deal in the USA as it is in 
modern China, but it does argue that in both countries reforms produced a sort of suc-
cessful convergence of both systems. Furthermore, state interventionism produced ex-
cellent results in East Asian countries. Finally, West Germany, a country established on 
the principles of a welfare state, was the most successful one in promoting economic 
growth in the Western Hemisphere after World War II.  
 At the beginning of 1990s, East European countries and countries in the former So-
viet Union started to transform their economies into market economies. After thirteen 
years of transition half of the countries in the region are still not capable to achieve the 
same level of economic development which they had at the end of communism. An av-
erage annual rate of GDP growth in the region, during the 1990-2002 period, is -.6 per-
cent (World Development Report, 2003: 238-9; World Development Report, 2004: 252-
3). Hence, Amsden et al. are right claiming that the economic hardships in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union “can be attributed both to the blanket rejection of 
any remnant of the immediate socialist past and, further, to the embrace by almost every 
country in the region of a simplistic capitalist experiment… Allowing first-rate firms to 
go to bankrupt and world-scale research and development laboratories to deteriorate has 
delayed not just catching up with the world’s richest countries but recovering pretransi-
tion income levels by several years (...) East Europe’s below-potential performance (...) 
has stemmed from copying the wrong capitalist model (...) The local true believers in 
the market were fortified by advisers from Western Universities, the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund. They pushed reforms in predictable directions, mini-
mizing the role of the state and postulating that uncontrolled markets are an infallible 
guarantee for robust output growth. These ideas follow from a fundamentalist reading of 
mainstream, neoclassical theory, which flourished during the administrations of Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush” (1994: 2-4, 18). 
 In other words, it was not the transition as such that caused the economic hardships 
in the former communist countries but an inappropriate model of transition. Countries in 
this region changed not only the bad elements of communism – lack of freedom and in-
dividual initiative – but also its advantages – low level of inequality, universal health 
care, active role of state in economy, etc. Therefore, it can be concluded that prudent 
and comprehensive state interventionism would have produced better results than the 
model of capitalism that was introduced after the collapse of communism. But this is 
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not only the experience of East Europe. Since the Great Depression, almost all the 
countries that had high rates of economic growth based their successes on state inter-
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